In the current economic climate, we should revisit the Councillors’ Commission’s plans for a national remuneration scheme, says Declan Hall
The current economic crisis, the Icelandic bank fiasco, and the furore over MPs expenses has strengthened the case to revisit one of the recommendations of the Councillors’ Commission – the establishment of a national independent remuneration panel (IRP) for English local government.
An IRP could consider the current economic factors on a national basis, whereas there is no guarantee the system of local IRPs and local choice will do so. Research for the Councillors’ Commission has indicated there is a growing disenchantment with the current system of local IRPs providing ‘independent’ advice and councillors making a decision.
Officers, particularly those in democratic services, find the current system burdensome, expensive, and it often puts them in a dubious position. Similarly, many councillors find the system politically fraught.
Local determination of councillors’ remuneration not only means varied – and sometimes bewildering – scope and levels of remuneration and reimbursement of expenses, but it also leaves councillors in a catch-22 situation. If they accept the reimbursement often recommended, they are pilloried in the local press, yet if they don’t, then they are not providing themselves with the necessary support to undertake the increasingly-demanding roles expected of them.
Taking the decision out of their hands avoids the public wrath which results from politicians voting on their own salaries in an era when private sector salaries are stagnating. Placing the decision in the hands of a national IRP also removes the politics inherent in the current system when councillors come to debate and vote on recommendations from their own local IRPs, which in themselves can be beset with problems of amateurism, cronyism, lack of understanding of the legal context and what councillors actually do, and conflicts of interest.
The present regime of local discretion largely arises out of the Local Government Act 2000 and subsequent regulations. Until 1995, members remuneration was set by the secretary of state.
Local government generally welcomed the new powers to set their own remuneration and reimbursements on the grounds of localism. The reality was that central prescription meant remuneration was kept low, and resulted in obtuse models of pay based largely on attendance.
A national IRP could overcome the weaknesses of the current system, without reintroducing the problems associated with the previous model of central prescription.
An IRP for England, membership of which would be through the public appointments system, would bring expertise, knowledge, competency and degree of objectivity. The terms of reference of an English IRP could include taking into account affordability and public acceptability, as is the case with the Scottish Local Authorities Remuneration Committee (SLARC), thus placing the work of an English IRP within the current economic climate.
The other main argument against an English IRP is that, unlike in unitary Scotland and Wales, it would be difficult to make recommendations across the board which take into account the multifaceted English local government system and much larger numbers of councils. Yet, the prototype already exists – the joint IRP for the London boroughs.
A similar approach could be applied to the various types of English local governments, with an IRP carrying out separate reviews for the metropolitan boroughs, the counties, the unitary and district councils and perhaps even a separate review for fourth option districts,
The existence of more than 200 district councils does suggest there is a stronger case for regional IRPs for districts. Similarly, the same process could be used to look at remuneration in authorities with executive mayors. Furthermore, an English IRP could bring in the joint authorities such as the PTAs, fire authorities, and other bodies to which councillors are appointed such as the national park authorities, the LGA, and even police authorities.
It would bring a transparency, consistency, and rigour to a process which is breaking down and becoming fragmented and discredited, both within and outside the town halls. It would remove councillor remuneration from the local political arena and the increasingly-vitriolic local media headlines.
Moreover, it would save local authorities a great deal of money and resources – in terms of both officer time and political resources – in the present economic climate.
It would set an example to Parliament, showing local government is prepared to have the power to determine its own pay, handed over an independent body which can rise above local political considerations while truly taking into account affordability and public perception.
Declan Hall is a lecturer at the Institute of Local Government Studies, University of Birmingham
An IRP could consider the current economic factors on a national basis, whereas there is no guarantee the system of local IRPs and local choice will do so. Research for the Councillors’ Commission has indicated there is a growing disenchantment with the current system of local IRPs providing ‘independent’ advice and councillors making a decision.
Officers, particularly those in democratic services, find the current system burdensome, expensive, and it often puts them in a dubious position. Similarly, many councillors find the system politically fraught.
Local determination of councillors’ remuneration not only means varied – and sometimes bewildering – scope and levels of remuneration and reimbursement of expenses, but it also leaves councillors in a catch-22 situation. If they accept the reimbursement often recommended, they are pilloried in the local press, yet if they don’t, then they are not providing themselves with the necessary support to undertake the increasingly-demanding roles expected of them.
Taking the decision out of their hands avoids the public wrath which results from politicians voting on their own salaries in an era when private sector salaries are stagnating. Placing the decision in the hands of a national IRP also removes the politics inherent in the current system when councillors come to debate and vote on recommendations from their own local IRPs, which in themselves can be beset with problems of amateurism, cronyism, lack of understanding of the legal context and what councillors actually do, and conflicts of interest.
The present regime of local discretion largely arises out of the Local Government Act 2000 and subsequent regulations. Until 1995, members remuneration was set by the secretary of state.
Local government generally welcomed the new powers to set their own remuneration and reimbursements on the grounds of localism. The reality was that central prescription meant remuneration was kept low, and resulted in obtuse models of pay based largely on attendance.
A national IRP could overcome the weaknesses of the current system, without reintroducing the problems associated with the previous model of central prescription.
An IRP for England, membership of which would be through the public appointments system, would bring expertise, knowledge, competency and degree of objectivity. The terms of reference of an English IRP could include taking into account affordability and public acceptability, as is the case with the Scottish Local Authorities Remuneration Committee (SLARC), thus placing the work of an English IRP within the current economic climate.
The other main argument against an English IRP is that, unlike in unitary Scotland and Wales, it would be difficult to make recommendations across the board which take into account the multifaceted English local government system and much larger numbers of councils. Yet, the prototype already exists – the joint IRP for the London boroughs.
A similar approach could be applied to the various types of English local governments, with an IRP carrying out separate reviews for the metropolitan boroughs, the counties, the unitary and district councils and perhaps even a separate review for fourth option districts,
The existence of more than 200 district councils does suggest there is a stronger case for regional IRPs for districts. Similarly, the same process could be used to look at remuneration in authorities with executive mayors. Furthermore, an English IRP could bring in the joint authorities such as the PTAs, fire authorities, and other bodies to which councillors are appointed such as the national park authorities, the LGA, and even police authorities.
It would bring a transparency, consistency, and rigour to a process which is breaking down and becoming fragmented and discredited, both within and outside the town halls. It would remove councillor remuneration from the local political arena and the increasingly-vitriolic local media headlines.
Moreover, it would save local authorities a great deal of money and resources – in terms of both officer time and political resources – in the present economic climate.
It would set an example to Parliament, showing local government is prepared to have the power to determine its own pay, handed over an independent body which can rise above local political considerations while truly taking into account affordability and public perception.
Declan Hall is a lecturer at the Institute of Local Government Studies, University of Birmingham
